Publication detail
Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model
Si, C. Fan, Y.V. Woon, K.S. Čuček, L. Dokl, M. Varbanov, P.S.
English title
Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model
Type
journal article in Scopus
Language
en
Original abstract
Life Cycle Assessment is the primary approach to quantify the environmental impacts of plastics. However, it encounters challenges in allocating the impacts of respective stages to stakeholders, especially for systems involving multi-cycles and end-of-life stages. This study proposes a framework integrating Cooperative Game Theory to assess and allocate the greenhouse gas footprint among stakeholders. The applied concepts are the Shapley Value, Nucleolus and Core. The applicability is demonstrated by a case study of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) with four recycling and landfill scenarios. The Shapley Value, which highlights fair allocation, suggests ∼ 792–1164 kg of unburdening CO2eq/t PET (∼ 47 % net recycling credits) assigned to material producers, 844.5–1216.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to product manufacturers, and the remaining ∼ 2–3 % to users. The Nucleolus stresses satisfactory results in 1531.5–2275.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to material producers, constituting ∼ 90 % of the total credits. The allocation does not change the total footprints; however, it is essential for the stakeholders’ cooperation in environmental initiatives.
English abstract
Life Cycle Assessment is the primary approach to quantify the environmental impacts of plastics. However, it encounters challenges in allocating the impacts of respective stages to stakeholders, especially for systems involving multi-cycles and end-of-life stages. This study proposes a framework integrating Cooperative Game Theory to assess and allocate the greenhouse gas footprint among stakeholders. The applied concepts are the Shapley Value, Nucleolus and Core. The applicability is demonstrated by a case study of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) with four recycling and landfill scenarios. The Shapley Value, which highlights fair allocation, suggests ∼ 792–1164 kg of unburdening CO2eq/t PET (∼ 47 % net recycling credits) assigned to material producers, 844.5–1216.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to product manufacturers, and the remaining ∼ 2–3 % to users. The Nucleolus stresses satisfactory results in 1531.5–2275.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to material producers, constituting ∼ 90 % of the total credits. The allocation does not change the total footprints; however, it is essential for the stakeholders’ cooperation in environmental initiatives.
Keywords in English
Cooperative Game Theory; End-of-life management; Environmental footprint allocation; Life Cycle Assessment; Multi-cycle recycling; Plastics
Released
01.04.2024
Publisher
Elsevier B.V.
Location
Elsevier B.V.
ISSN
0921-3449
Number
203
Pages count
10
BIBTEX
@article{BUT187946,
author="Chunyan {Si} and Yee Van {Fan} and Petar Sabev {Varbanov},
title="Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model",
year="2024",
number="203",
month="April",
publisher="Elsevier B.V.",
address="Elsevier B.V.",
issn="0921-3449"
}